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1 Introduction 
It is widely recognized that regional inequality in China has been on the rise since 
economic reforms were initiated in the late 1970s (Kanbur and Zhang 2005; Wan 2005). 
In addition to its repercussions on social and political stability, such a rise has hampered 
poverty alleviation (Ravallion and Chen 2004; Zhang and Wan 2006) and is found to be 
detrimental to long-run economic growth (Wan et al. 2006). Many Chinese scholars also 
consider high inequality as a major contributor to the sluggish domestic demand in 
China. It is thus not surprising to witness a broad and growing interest in China’s 
regional inequality. Earlier studies largely focused on the measurement of regional 
inequality. Subsequent efforts were devoted to breakdown total inequality into various 
components, either by population subgroups (Tsui 1991) or by factor components (Wan 
2001). Recently, the technique of regression based decomposition has gained popularity 
(Fields and Yoo 2000; Morduch and Sicular 2002; Wan 2002) and has been applied to 
China (Morduch and Sicular 2002; Wan 2004; Wan and Zhou 2005). 
 
Despite a large volume of literature on regional inequality in China, few existing studies 
constructed time profiles of inequality among rural regions in China.1 This is surprising 
given that a dominant proportion of China’s population live in the countryside and, as 
discussed later, rural inequality is a large component of the overall regional inequality. 
More importantly, rural inequality is fundamentally different from the urban counterpart 
in terms of causes, trends and policy implications. For example, geography is much 
more important in driving rural inequality than the urban inequality. When 
encompassing weather, infrastructure and other natural resources, the geography 
variable would account for a very significant share of total rural inequality. This is not 
necessarily the case for the urban sector despite the probable relevance of location as a 
determinant of wages. Needless to say, distribution of arable land is relevant to rural 
inequality but not to the urban counterpart in China. Clearly, while studies on whole 
China or urban China are important, there exist obvious justifications for a separate 
paper focusing on rural China. 
 
This paper will fill such a gap in the literature by providing a time profile of regional 
income inequality in rural China for the period 1985-2002. Such a time profile was 
appealed for by Rozelle (1994). Another purpose of the paper is to identify the 
components of rural regional inequality. This is accomplished by undertaking 
conventional as well as regression-based inequality decompositions. These 
decompositions offer different insights into the determinants of the total inequality. 
Policy implications, also, will be explored. 
                                                 
1 A search in Econlit using keywords ‘China’, ‘region’, ‘rural’ and ‘inequality’ produced 59 journal 
article entries and only a few of them touched on, but did not focused on, rural regional inequality.   2
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the data and the time 
profile of rural regional inequality, wherein conventional and newly proposed methods 
will be employed to decompose total inequality into two broad components: between 
regional belts (i.e., east-central-west China) and within these belts. Section 3 applies the 
regression-based decomposition to rural China, which helps reveal the root sources of 
regional inequality. Finally, we discuss policy implications in Section 4. 
2  Data and preliminary analysis  
As a precursory note, it is useful to mention that a substantial proportion, in the order of 
25 per cent or so, of China’s regional inequality is attributable to the urban–rural gap.2 
The remaining is due to inequalities within urban and rural regions. In accounting for 
the total regional inequality for China as a whole, these so-called within-components are 
given by their respective Theil-L index estimates, weighted by their population shares. 
Since the unweighted rural regional inequality is found to be larger than the urban 
counterpart (Wan 2005) and a dominant percentage of population lives in the rural 
areas, the contribution of rural regional inequality to the total must be substantial. 
 
To accomplish research objectives of this paper, most of our data are compiled from the 
China Rural Household Survey Yearbook (NBS various years) for the period 1985-
2002. Earlier data are incomplete. Ideally, rural population should be used as our 
income observations are for rural residents. However, we failed to find consistent rural 
population series for all regions. Instead, agricultural population statistics are used. 
They are expected to be highly correlated with the rural population and are available 
from the China Rural Statistical Yearbook (NBS various years). Excluding Hong Kong, 
Taiwan and Macao, there are 31 regions (provinces, autonomous regions or 
metropolitan cities) in China. However, our sample contains data for 28 regions with 
Hainan merged with Guangdong, Congqing merged with Sichuan, and Xizang (Tibet) 
excluded. Data for Tibet are not complete. As argued by Wan (2001), such exclusion is 
not expected to distort the analytical results. All data in value terms are deflated by 
regional rural consumer price indices (CPIs) as well as the regional price indices 
compiled by Brandt and Carsten (2004). 
 
The deflated regional income data are plotted in Figure 1 against years; for each year the 
plot contains per capita real incomes for all 28 regions. The Figure shows that while real 
income has been increasing over time, its dispersion is also on the rise as indicated by 
the expanding height of the plots over time. According to Figure 1, regional incomes 
had been increasing over 1985-89. After a setback for most regions in 1989-90, the 
 
                                                 
2 If differences in price levels and inflations between urban and rural areas were not considered, this 
proportion would be over-estimated as in Kanbur and Zhang (1999). See Sicular et al. (2007).   3
























increasing trend resumed. The setback is probably caused by the austerity programme 
initiated by the Chinese government in 1989 (Wan 2001). 
 
Reasonably assuming no changes in the composition of regions in the rich and poor 
groups, the poor (lower segments of the plots) consistently experienced slower income 
growth than the rich (upper segments of the plots). In fact, real income declined or was 
stagnant before 1996 for the poor regions as a group. Even after a small rise in 1996, 
this group’s income rose little over 1996-2002. In contrast, income increased from 1985 
to 1988 for the rich regions. For this group, there was a small drop in income in 1989, 
but the increasing trend resumed right after and continued strongly until 2002. Judging 
from these observations, one may conclude that regional income inequality in rural 
China has been increasing in both absolute as well as relative terms, respectively 
indicated by the expanding height of the plots over time, and by the differing growth 
rates for the poor and rich regions. 
 
Examination of Figure 1 reveals that the gaps between the income groups (top, middle, 
and bottom segments of the plots) seem to have expanded more than those within these 
groups or segments. This clustering of regional income in recent years implies some 






















between income groups than within income groups. Nevertheless, Figure 1 may be 
misleading as far as gathering inequality trend is concerned because the expansion in 
income dispersion had been accompanied by changes in income levels. It is known that 
an identical income growth for all regions can also result in increased dispersions, as in 
Figure 1, but such growth leaves inequality unchanged as long as relative rather than 
absolute inequality measures are used. 
 
A formal way to analyze inequality is to construct Lorenz curves and conduct stochastic 
dominance analysis. For this purpose, Lorenz curves are obtained for each of the 18 
years. Although there is a tendency for the Lorenz curve to move downwards over time, 
any first-degree stochastic dominance is not clearly visible when they are all displayed 
in one diagram. On the one hand, this may be caused by ‘too much information’—many 
curves are squeezed onto one diagram. On the other, this is understandable as inequality 
changes are usually small from one year to the next. To reduce distractions caused by 
‘too much information’, we average Lorenz curves over a 3-year interval and present 
these curves in Figure 2. Unfortunately, even Figure 2 does not exhibit any first-degree 
stochastic dominance very clearly. As a consequence, pair-wise comparisons of these 
curves have to be done and they indicate that nine out of the 15 pairs of the Lorenz 
curves cross, mostly at the top or bottom ends of the distributions. 
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When Lorenz curves cross, they cannot be used to rank income distributions. In this 
case, second or higher degree of stochastic dominance can be introduced. Alternatively, 
summary inequality measures could be used instead (Fields 2001). To minimize 
possible sensitivities to inequality measures,3 we compute most relative inequality 
indices that are commonly in use, namely the Gini, Theil-L, Theil-T and half CV
2.4 
 
Let  Z denote the target variable, μ denote the mean of Z,  j index observations   

























. The Atkinson index is not 
considered here because it can be expressed as a monotonic transformation of Theil-L 
(Shorrocks and Slotjje 2002).  
 
The computed values are tabulated in Table 1 (left panel). Since CV
2 violates the 
principle of transfer, values in the last column are reported only for comparison purpose 
as there are many studies in China using the measure CV
2. Results in Table 1 show that 
all measures are consistent in demonstrating a rising trend in regional inequality in rural 
China. In particular, the inequality increased rather dramatically until 1995-96. After 
that, the increasing trend became moderate. This finding is consistent with Figure 1, 
which shows that income of poor regions experienced little growth before 1995-96 but 
some improvement afterwards while the rich regions exhibited growth throughout the 
period. The slowing down in inequality increases after 1995-96 may be caused by the 
implementation of the grain price support policy which benefited poor regions more 
(Zhang 2005). Since the trend was only moderated, not really reversed, other forces 
must be stronger than the policy change in pushing up the long-run inequality trend. 
Identifying these other forces is crucial for policymakers if rural regional inequality is 
needs to be brought down. 
 
As a by-product, we calculated inequality values using undeflated data (see the right 
panel in Table 1). As is expected, not taking into consideration inflation and regional 
price levels leads to upward biases in inequality measurement. The biases are quite 
substantial. What is interesting, and perhaps surprising, is that the biases are larger in 
                                                 
3 Different measures imply different social welfare functions and different aversions to inequality (see 
Dagnum 1990). 
4 There exist alternative ways to calculate the Gini coefficient. We follow Silber (1989) by defining Gini 
= P´QI, where P is the vector containing population shares and I is the vector containing income shares, 
both sorted in ascending  order by the per capita income variable. Q is a square matrix with 0 on the 
diagonal, 1 above the diagonal and -1 below the diagonal.   6
the early years, a finding consistent with Brandt and Carsten (2004). Also, the biases are 
less severe when using Gini relative to other measures, possibly due to the differing 
sensitivities of these measures to different sections of the underlying Lorenz curves. 
 
Table 1: Regional inequality in rural China 
  Deflated data    Undeflated data 
 Gini  Theil-L  Theil-T  CV
2  Gini  Theil-L  Theil-T  CV
2 
1985 0.109  0.020  0.019  0.037   0.152 0.038  0.042 0.095 
1986 0.123  0.025  0.024  0.047   0.171 0.047  0.050 0.114 
1987 0.129  0.027  0.026  0.052   0.180 0.052  0.056 0.127 
1988 0.134  0.029  0.028  0.057   0.187 0.056  0.061 0.138 
1989 0.137  0.030  0.029  0.059   0.194 0.060  0.065 0.148 
1990 0.141  0.032  0.031  0.062   0.198 0.063  0.069 0.162 
1991 0.142  0.032  0.032  0.065   0.208 0.070  0.078 0.185 
1992 0.151  0.036  0.036  0.072   0.215 0.074  0.082 0.194 
1993 0.164  0.043  0.042  0.086   0.231 0.084  0.094 0.226 
1994 0.170  0.046  0.045  0.090   0.228 0.082  0.089 0.210 
1995 0.186  0.056  0.054  0.107   0.234 0.085  0.092 0.211 
1996 0.188  0.058  0.055  0.109   0.221 0.076  0.080 0.180 
1997 0.186  0.057  0.054  0.106   0.214 0.072  0.076 0.169 
1998 0.186  0.056  0.053  0.105   0.208 0.067  0.071 0.158 
1999 0.188  0.058  0.055  0.109   0.212 0.070  0.074 0.164 
2000 0.188  0.057  0.055  0.110   0.219 0.075  0.080 0.181 
2001 0.195  0.061  0.059  0.118   0.225 0.079  0.084 0.190 
2002 0.195  0.062  0.059  0.119   0.226 0.080  0.085 0.194 
3 Spatial  decomposition 
To assess if the rising inequality is due to enlarged gaps between regional belts or 
within regional belts, we undertake subgroup decomposition following Shorrocks 
(1984). As in most studies, we divide China into three belts. The central belt includes 
Shanxi, Guangxi, Inner Mongolia, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei 
and Hunan. The west belt includes Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Shaanxi, Gansu, 
Qinghai, Ningxia, and Xinjiang. The east belt consists of the remaining regions, all 
along the coast. The inequality index we use is the Theil-L coefficient. Other inequality 
measures are not appropriate for the conventional subgroup decomposition; see 
Shorrocks and Wan (2005). 
 
The decomposition results are shown in Figure 3 (numerical values are tabulated in 
Appendix Table A1). It is found that (a) all individual components (within each belt and 
between belts) exhibit increasing trends, clearly demonstrating income divergence 
within belts as well as divergence between belts; (b) the divergence between belts 
expanded faster than divergence across regions within belts, resulting in a growing 
share of the between-component; (c) there is an oscillatory cycle around the total   7
Figure 3A: Traditional east-central-west decomposition: Theil-L 
 

































































































































































































inequality trend and it is largely driven by the between-component. This implies that 
there are forces driving inter-belt income divergence, and they fluctuate from year to 
year. These forces may include cyclical weather conditions, the ‘cobweb phenomena’ 
often present in the agricultural sector, and biological cycles of perennial crops or 
plants. For example, differences in production structure across the belts may contribute 
to the cyclical pattern. The west and central produce more grain and fruits. Fruits 
typically have a bumper year followed by a lean year and this contributes to the income 
correlation between regions within these belts. In a bumper year, the income gaps 
between the coast and inland regions will narrow, otherwise they will expand. Weather 
and market conditions also vary from year to year. In bad years, regions producing 
similar products will suffer income drops together, leading to larger income gaps 
between belts. In good years, these gaps may narrow down; (d) the year 1995 deserves 
special attention. In this year, total inequality jumped more than usual and all 
components seem to have reached their peak values. After 1995, the between-
component stayed more or less constant but all within-components continued to rise, 
particularly that within the west belt. It would be interesting to explore if this is related 
to the major taxation reform implemented in 1994. Also, grain price support policy was 
introduced in 1995. Such a nationwide policy shift certainly helped raise income levels 
of the poor regions more, leading to smaller gaps between regional belts.  
 
One can add up all the within-components and compute their overall percentage 
contribution to total inequality. Figure 4 confirms the early observation that the total 
















Traditional Theil-L  10
contribution has not. It is also clear that the declining trend was contained from 1995 to 
1998 and resumed after 1999. Given the finding that the between-component is a 
positive function of the number of groups involved in subgroup decompositions 
(Shorrocks and Wan 2005), such a large and increasing between-component is rather 
surprising. Here, there are only three groups and yet the between-component is so large, 
which must imply very substantial inter-belt income gaps. Note that current literature 
points to a small between-component with only a few exceptions (Shorrocks and Wan 
2005).  
 
Looking into the individual within-components (see Appendix Table A1), dispersions 
within the west belt were rather small and those within the central belt were large until 
the late 1990s and early 2000s. The within-component of the east belt was moderate in 
the 1980s. It increased to a level more or less compatible to that of the central belt 
around the mid 1990s. Since then, the contribution of the east belt dominated the total 
within-component. Thus, as far as the within components are concerned, the east is 
more important. It is beyond the scope of this paper to explore why the east regions 
became least homogeneous while the west regions were always more homogeneous. 
 
What about sensitivity of the above decomposition results to inequality measures? 
Previously, it has been uncommon or inappropriate to use inequality measures other 
than the Theil-L index for subgroup decomposition. Therefore, examining sensitivity in 
this context has so far been rare or not possible. In what follows, we propose a subgroup 
decomposition procedure which can be used with any inequality measures. We then 
apply this approach to the Chinese data. Empirical outcomes will be compared with the 
earlier results. 
 
Our approach is inspired by the Shapley procedure of Shorrocks (1999). Briefly put, 
applying this procedure requires a function between the target variable such as income 
and its determinants. Expressing the function as Y = f(X), one can then apply any 
operator to both sides of the equation and attribute the total value, as defined by the 
operator, to the contributions made by individual elements in X. For example, given an 
income generating function, one can apply inequality operator to both sides of the 
function, and attribute total income inequality to various components associated with 
income determinants. Since an identity is a special function, we will rely on a defined 
identity to decompose regional inequality into the between-belt and within-belt 
components. 
 
The identity we define must express regional income as a function, being linear or non-
linear, of income gaps between regional belts and income gaps across regions within 
belts. This can be achieved by defining ui as the average income of, and di as the 
dummy variable for, belt i. Also, let δ1 denote deviations of per capita income of eastern 
regions from the average income of the east belt. Similarly we can define δ2 and δ3. 
Now, regional income Y can be written as   11
Y = ui + d1δ1 + d2δ2 + d3 δ3             ( 1 )  
 
It is noted that ui take identical values for those regions belonging to the same belt. 
Therefore, it can be used to represent income gaps between belts. The other three terms 
in (1) capture income gaps across regions within individual belts. 
 
We can proceed by constructing various counterfactuals. Assume absence of income 
gaps between belts (i.e., all three belts have the same mean income, say national 
average, as denoted by u) as well as absence of income gaps within belts. This is 
equivalent to replacing ui by u and d1δ1, d2δ2, d3 δ3 by 0. Substituting these into (1) will 
produce identical income for every region. In this case, regional inequality is zero. Now, 
permitting presence of income gaps between belts only (i.e., ui take their defined values) 
while keeping income gaps within individual belts absent (i.e., d1δ1 = d2δ2 = d3 δ3 = 0). 
We can substitute these values into (1) and calculate the corresponding inequality. This 
inequality is only caused by income gaps between belts, not within belts. By the same 
token, we can replace ui by u and any two of d1δ1, d2δ2, d3 δ3 by 0 (only one of them 
taking its defined values), the corresponding inequality must be due to income gaps 
within the relevant belt. This kind of counterfactual can be constructed under all 
possible combinations of replacements. Alternative estimates of the same inequality 
component can be obtained; they are averaged to reach the final estimate. This is 
essentially what Shapley decomposition does (see Shorrocks 1999; Wan and Zhou 
2005). 
 
Applying the above decomposition to Chinese data produces results that are quite 
consistent with the earlier decomposition results (see Table A2 in the Appendix). For 
comparison purpose, we plot the between-component in Figure 4 as well. The plot 
resembles the traditional decomposition results quite well, indicating the robustness of 
earlier decomposition results. For example, they show a clear declining trend in the 
percentage contribution of the overall within-components. As the number of regions in 
each belt is kept constant for the decomposition, the faster increases in the between-
component are indicative of enlarging income gaps between belts more than those 
within belts, confirming the early finding of polarization. Interestingly, the results are 
slightly different when the Gini index is used. The other three give almost 
indistinguishable percentage contributions. According to the Gini decomposition, the 
within-component was almost 50 per cent in 1985, and became smaller over time 
reaching 45 per cent in 2002. The other indicators show similar declining trends, but 
starting with 45 per cent in 1985 declining to 35 per cent in 2002. 
4  Sources of rural regional inequality 
Given the consistent rises in regional inequality in rural China, one naturally wonders 
what factors drive this trend. It is not difficult to speculate about possible determinants 
of regional inequality in China. What is more interesting and challenging is to quantify   12
the contributions of these determinants. Kanbur (2002) appealed for linking inequality 
with fundamental variables because simply breaking down total inequality into the usual 
within- and between-components (as done in the preceding section) is insufficient. To 
quantify contributions of various determinants to total inequality, we follow the 
regression-based decomposition approach of Wan (2004), which has a number of 
advantages. In particular, it does not depend on inequality measures; it is applicable 
irrespective of functional form for the regression equation, and it permits interactive 
terms of independent variables. Interested readers are referred to Wan (2002). 
 
Intuitively, if every region possesses the same amount of every input as well as same 
returns to factors, there would be no inequality. Same returns may not be realistic, but 
has been presumed in most, if not all, previous studies. We will deal with differing 
returns in a separate paper. Assuming same returns, it is the spatial distributions of 
factor inputs that matter. Postulating, without loss of generality, that the marginal 
impact of a factor is positive on income generation, its dispersion would contribute 
positively to inequality if the input variable is positively correlated with total income. 
On the contrary, if rich regions possess less of this factor than poor regions, it would 
help reduce regional inequality. In the unlikely case of a linear income function Y = Σ βi 
Xi + β0, it is possible to express the Gini index of income as a weighted sum of 
concentration indices of factor inputs: 
 
Gini (Y) = Σ βi E(Xi)/E(Y) C(Xi)        (2) 
 
where  βi denotes marginal income of Xi,  E is the expectation operator, and C(Xi) 
denotes the concentration index of Xi. Resembling the Gini coefficient, C(Xi) is a 
measure of dispersion of Xi. It takes values between 1 and -1. Broadly speaking, if Xi 
and Y are positively correlated, C(Xi) > 0. Otherwise, C(Xi) < 0. Although equation (2) 
may not be derivable under other inequality indices or when the income function is not 
strictly linear, it does help demonstrate our point that total inequality can be accounted 
for by dispersions of factor inputs. 
 
Turning to empirical factor-income relationships in China, we plot income against each 
of the input variables—see Figure 5. The trend lines in the figure indicate that capital, 
schooling, and industrialization are positively correlated with income while land is 
perhaps unrelated to income. Figure 5D depicts a non-linear curve between income and 
schooling or education. To a lesser extent non-linearity also appears in Figure 5B where 
the correlation does not seem to exist. Of course, such bivariate correlations may not 
reveal the true relationship as other factors are not controlled for. Also, the impact of 
factor dispersions on total inequality cannot be directly discerned from Figure 5. To 
account for rural regional inequality in China, we now turn to the regression-based 
decomposition technique. 
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Essentially, the regression based decomposition combines a regression model with the 
Shapley value framework of Shorrocks (1999). The basic idea is to attribute inequality 
in the dependent variable to contributions of the residual and independent variables in 
the regression equation. Following the before-after principle of Cancian and Reed 
(1998), Wan (2004) proposed to define the contribution of the residual by I(Y) – I(Ŷ), 
where Ŷ is the predicted value based on the estimated regression model and I denotes 
any inequality measure. To obtain the contributions of independent variables to I(Ŷ), the 
Shapley procedure developed by Shorrocks (1999) can be applied. The procedure is 
fully founded on the co-operative game theory and is applicable irrespective of the 
functional form or inequality measure—for technical details, see Shorrocks (1999). 
 
To estimate the empirical income-generation function, we start with the human capital 
theory which dictates that income is a function of education and experience. At the 
aggregate regional level, it is not possible to define experience or its proxy. Further, 
rural income also depends on production inputs such as land, capital and so on. 
Consequently, we consider the following variables: 
 
Y = per capita net income (yuan/head); 
K = capital stock (1000 yuan/head); 
Land = arable land (mu/head, 1 mu = 1/15 Ha); 
DEP = dependency ratio; 
HH = household size; 
IND = degree of industrialization = wage income/net income; 




































Note that DEP and HH are included to control for labour input since these three 
variables are linearly related, thus inclusion of any two of the three is sufficient. In 
addition, regional dummy variables (to account for geographic location and location-
related factors) and dummy variables for years 1992 (marking Deng Xiaoping’s tour of 
southern China), 1995 (marking the start of the grain price support policy) are included. 
Also, a time trend variable is incorporated to control for possible changes in macro-
economic environment and technology or other shifts over time.  
 
Regarding functional form, the conventional practice is to specify a log-linear form, the 
so-called Mincer function. We experimented with log-linear, linear-linear, double-log 
and linear-log (i.e., the dependent variable is untransformed but independent variables 
are in logarithms). Given our panel data model, the disturbance term is proposed to be 
heteroscedastic across regions and autoregressive over time for individual regions. 















ρi denotes the correlation coefficient between successive errors for region i. The 
estimation can be easily implemented using the econometric software Shazam. 
 
Estimation results for the income-generation functions are presented in Table 2 (dummy 
variable and time trend terms are not reported but are available from the author upon 
request). The usual χ
2 test can be employed to choose between the log-linear and 
double-log models, and between the linear-linear and linear-log models. The test 
statistic is given by twice the absolute difference in the log-likelihood values of relevant 
models, with degrees of freedom equal to the difference in the number of parameters in 
theses models. Since all the models have the same number of parameters, one can 
simply compare the relevant log-likelihood values and make a choice. As a 
consequence, the linear-linear and log-linear models are preferred. 
   16
Table 2: Estimation results of income functions 
 Estimate  T-ratio  p-value   Estimate  T-ratio  p-value 
 log-log    linear-log 
K 0.2033  9.74  0.00   75.7670  6.51  0.00 
K
2 0.0000  3.16  0.00   0.0003  4.17  0.00 
Land -0.0596  -4.16  0.00   -22.4760  -2.57  0.01 
EDU -1.1840  -3.19  0.00   -939.3500  -3.70  0.00 
EDU
2 0.4569  4.32  0.00   305.1200  4.41  0.00 
HH 0.0592  1.13  0.26   21.6230  0.83  0.41 
DEP -0.0226  -2.14  0.03   -8.5414  -1.78  0.08 
IND 0.0067  7.34  0.00   2.5553  4.93  0.00 
Constant 5.6803  13.94  0.00   792.1800  3.03  0.00 
             
Buse R2    0.9994        0.9465   
Log-likelihood value  613.84        -2503.42   
RSS   2.47        572260.00   
      
 log-linear    linear-linear 
K 0.19  10.60  0.00   80.96  8.08  0.00 
K
2 -0.013  -5.16  0.00    -4.5988 -3.43 0.00 
LAND -0.0174  -3.04  0.00   -7.6558  -2.43  0.02 
EDU  0.0036  0.09 0.93   -41.3810 -1.68  0.09 
EDU
2 0.0052  1.70  0.09   5.1783  2.88  0.00 
HH 0.0093  0.87  0.39   6.2726  1.19  0.24 
DEP -0.0226  -2.17  0.03   -8.6538  -1.83  0.07 
IND 0.0065  6.87  0.00   2.5312  4.89  0.00 
Constant 5.6361  32.95  0.00   424.5800  4.30  0.00 
             
Buse R2    0.9994        0.9469   
Log-likelihood value  617.83        -2496.62   
RSS   2.43        555290.00   
 
Selection between the two preferred models can be implemented by the χ
2 test derived 
by Box and Cox (1964), where the null hypothesis is equivalence of the log-linear and 
















which is distributed as χ
2(1), where  exp[( log )/ ] i CY N = ∑ , N is the sample size and 
RSS1 ( RSS2) denotes the residual sum of squares from the linear-linear (log-linear)   17
models. Substituting the relevant values into the above expression, we obtained l = 73.3. 
When the null hypothesis is rejected, as in this paper, the log-linear model is selected if 
RSS1/C
2 > RSS2. Otherwise, the linear-linear model is selected. Since the ratio of 
RSS1/C
2 to RSS2 is 1.34, the log-linear model is the finally chosen income generating 
function for rural China. 
 
The log-linear model possesses expected signs for most of the estimated coefficients. 
After controlling for the dependency ratio, any increase in household size (HH) implies 
more labour input. From this perspective, the positive sign associated with HH is 
justified and is consistent with Wan (2004). The negative estimate for the land variable 
is not unexpected as cropping is known to make loss or little profit (Wan and Cheng 
2001). Non-linearity is present for the capital input and possibly the schooling variable. 
The model fits the data quite well as indicated by the reasonably high R
2 and t-ratios. 
We decided not to drop the non-significant variables, in order to minimize data-mining. 
 
Before proceeding to inequality decomposition, it is necessary to solve the estimated 
equation for income Y so inequality is measured over income rather than logarithm of 
income. Solving the log-linear model, we have: 
 
Y = exp(5.64)·exp(0.19K – 0.013 K
2 -0.017 Land +0.0036 EDU + 0.0052 EDU
2  
       + 0.0093 HH – 0.0226 DEP + 0.0065 IND + Loc)·exp(other terms)  
 
where Loc is the sum of all regional dummy variable terms and other terms is the sum 
of all year dummy variable terms, time trend and the residual terms. Loc represents 
geographical conditions, weather, water and other non-removable natural resources as 
well as infrastructure. When relative inequality indicators are used, as in this paper, 
terms associated with the constant and time trend terms (including year dummy 
variables) can be removed from the equation without affecting the decomposition 
results. This is because inequality is measured for each year and these terms are all 
scalars of the income variable Y (recall the homogeneity theorem of relative inequality 
measures). Also, the contribution of residual is given by I(Y) – I(Ŷ), where Ŷ is the 
predicted value based on the estimated regression model Thus, the final equation for 
Shapley decomposition is: 
 
Ŷ = exp(0.19K – 0.013 K
2 -0.017 Land +0.0036 EDU + 0.0052 EDU
2 + 0.0093 HH  
       – 0.0226 DEP + 0.0065 IND + Loc) 
 
The decomposition is implemented using a Java programme developed by the World 
Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER). Decomposition results 
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Table 3: Sources of regional inequality in rural China explained by the regression model (%) 
  K Land EDU HH IND DEP Loc Sum K Land EDU HH IND DEP Loc Sum
 Gini Theil-L
1985 14.98 2.16 18.68 -0.70 15.04 0.95 78.71 129.82 11.06 0.30 23.44 -2.03 17.91 0.86 110.91 162.46
1986 7.93 1.90 16.96 -0.63 13.90 1.47 69.73 111.26 0.12 0.56 18.35 -1.55 15.01 1.59 86.70 120.77
1987 7.03 2.17 15.94 -0.47 14.05 0.50 66.47 105.69 -1.08 0.78 17.05 -1.30 14.92 0.48 81.32 112.10
1988 8.07 2.30 14.38 -0.60 14.04 0.61 64.71 103.51 0.66 0.98 14.53 -1.43 13.98 0.63 76.12 105.44
1989 8.44 2.21 14.26 -0.63 14.63 0.63 64.02 103.56 1.82 0.88 14.58 -1.48 15.69 0.67 76.40 108.55
1990 9.87 2.02 15.90 -0.61 13.25 0.60 63.60 104.62 4.36 0.70 16.60 -1.49 13.25 0.60 74.57 108.63
1991 12.31 1.96 14.73 -0.54 13.73 0.61 61.48 104.28 6.96 0.46 15.24 -1.39 14.47 0.65 73.50 109.89
1992 11.90 2.31 15.88 -0.65 15.02 0.54 59.52 104.51 7.94 0.94 16.78 -1.56 15.83 0.56 70.31 110.83
1993 13.88 2.59 12.51 -0.59 14.59 0.54 54.91 98.43 10.73 1.29 11.86 -1.32 14.04 0.56 60.64 97.84
1994 15.00 2.67 12.69 -0.58 15.27 0.56 52.89 98.51 12.31 1.36 11.81 -1.27 14.55 0.58 57.40 96.74
1995 16.31 1.87 13.10 -0.47 11.60 0.49 47.37 90.27 12.50 0.43 11.80 -0.88 10.11 0.47 47.92 82.36
1996 17.95 2.06 12.16 -0.39 12.10 0.47 45.92 90.26 13.71 0.59 10.88 -0.76 10.67 0.45 46.30 81.84
1997 18.37 2.48 13.02 -0.42 13.17 0.46 46.60 93.69 14.31 1.01 12.31 -0.82 11.33 0.45 47.52 86.11
1998 20.20 2.41 11.76 -0.38 12.54 0.39 46.20 93.12 15.91 0.94 10.54 -0.75 10.75 0.37 46.87 84.62
1999 20.86 2.19 11.67 -0.28 11.32 0.42 45.03 91.21 16.86 0.67 10.44 -0.60 9.38 0.41 45.61 82.79
2000 23.14 2.24 11.26 -0.22 12.28 0.41 44.98 94.09 19.91 0.80 10.55 -0.58 10.67 0.42 46.70 88.47
2001 24.20 2.20 9.43 -0.27 11.06 0.41 44.01 91.05 20.41 0.65 8.01 -0.60 8.89 0.41 44.09 81.88
2002 25.06 2.06 10.93 -0.29 9.45 0.38 43.49 91.08 21.55 0.33 9.80 -0.63 7.01 0.39 43.81 82.25
 Theil-T CV2
1985 11.83 0.11 23.56 -2.11 18.33 0.79 111.99 164.55 13.00 -0.24 24.15 -2.22 18.90 0.73 113.84 168.18
1986 -0.83 0.70 18.09 -1.61 15.61 1.61 87.48 121.07 -1.83 0.84 18.05 -1.73 16.35 1.66 88.31 121.70
1987 -2.11 0.92 16.54 -1.34 15.39 0.50 80.97 110.87 -3.24 1.08 16.25 -1.37 15.96 0.54 80.67 109.86
1988 0.00 1.06 14.32 -1.52 14.46 0.64 75.47 104.50 -0.65 1.16 14.21 -1.59 15.04 0.67 74.73 103.58
1989 1.26 0.95 14.17 -1.53 15.95 0.68 75.26 106.75 0.69 1.06 13.92 -1.60 16.30 0.73 74.15 105.25
1990 3.71 0.81 16.26 -1.48 13.71 0.65 74.15 107.81 3.09 0.90 16.03 -1.51 14.24 0.66 73.63 107.06  19
1991 5.97 0.53 14.57 -1.34 14.57 0.63 71.96 106.88 5.00 0.60 13.99 -1.31 14.70 0.65 70.25 103.88
1992 7.24 1.15 15.95 -1.52 16.23 0.56 69.17 108.82 6.68 1.38 15.22 -1.53 16.75 0.59 68.02 107.13
1993 10.21 1.50 11.23 -1.28 14.34 0.57 59.66 96.23 9.87 1.68 10.58 -1.25 14.66 0.60 58.30 94.43
1994 12.35 1.62 11.37 -1.27 15.24 0.60 57.75 97.64 12.65 1.89 10.91 -1.28 16.07 0.64 58.00 98.89
1995 12.68 0.58 11.40 -0.91 10.56 0.50 48.31 83.12 13.00 0.75 10.92 -0.93 11.13 0.52 48.41 83.80
1996 13.77 0.82 10.49 -0.80 11.33 0.47 46.75 82.84 13.96 1.04 10.10 -0.83 12.09 0.51 46.95 83.83
1997 14.49 1.29 11.83 -0.85 12.13 0.48 48.21 87.60 14.78 1.59 11.37 -0.87 13.05 0.50 48.64 89.05
1998 16.48 1.24 10.23 -0.81 11.71 0.39 47.85 87.12 17.14 1.54 9.88 -0.86 12.79 0.41 48.52 89.44
1999 17.35 0.95 10.01 -0.64 10.16 0.42 46.32 84.56 17.90 1.24 9.56 -0.68 11.08 0.42 46.78 86.32
2000 20.39 1.09 10.16 -0.60 11.54 0.44 47.15 90.15 20.89 1.40 9.80 -0.64 12.56 0.46 47.35 91.81
2001 21.11 0.94 7.61 -0.63 9.64 0.43 44.82 83.91 21.79 1.23 7.18 -0.65 10.47 0.45 45.18 85.66
2002 22.19 0.63 9.25 -0.68 7.54 0.39 44.12 83.45 22.72 0.91 8.69 -0.71 8.16 0.40 43.98 84.14
Source: see text. 
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are presented in Table 3.5 Judging from the proportions of inequality explained by the 
estimated model, our analytical results are quite satisfactory. We can explain 80 per cent 
or more of total inequality. It is not unexpected that decomposition outcomes vary with 
inequality measures. However, they are broadly consistent in ranking contributors and 
in portraying the time trends of individual contributions. Consequently, discussion 
hereafter will be based on those under Gini only. 
 
For large countries such as China, the variable Loc (representing geography, non-
removable resources, weather conditions, and so on) is expected to make a very 
substantial contribution to total regional inequality. This is particularly true for rural 
China and more so for the early years. In a subsistence society with a closed economy, 
no market exists and proximity to markets and ports are irrelevant to income. In such 
cases, a dominant proportion of regional inequality can be explained by the Loc 
variable. In the early days of rural China, markets were fragmented and rural income 
was almost entirely derived from farming which heavily depends on soil, water and 
weather conditions. Therefore, it is not surprising to see overwhelming contributions of 
the Loc variable in the 1980s. As non-farming income increases and as markets are 
developed and infrastructure are improved in poor areas, the percentage contribution of 
Loc started to decline, a finding consistent with a priori expectations6. 
 
Despite the reduction in its percentage contribution, the importance of Loc cannot be 
over-looked. This is so for several reasons. First, its absolute contribution had been 
maintained over time. Even in terms of relative contributions, it ranked number one 
throughout the period under consideration. Second, Loc in this paper not only means 
local natural resources, but also means access to market, information and technology or 
even investment. The latter directly affects productivity and resource endowment, and 
indirectly affects efficiency of resource use. Finally, natural resources in terms of land 
quality and quantity, weather, and water are not subject to market development or 
infrastructure improvement. It is true that as infrastructure improves for poor regions, 
locational disadvantages for the inland regions might be alleviated. Nevertheless, these 
disadvantages could never be eliminated since transportation and communication costs 
would always be non-decreasing functions of distance to ports and major markets. 
 
Uneven distribution of capital ranks the third in the 1980s but its contribution gradually 
increased to over 25 percent, making it the second largest contributor to regional 
inequality in rural China after 1996. This result is in line with Wan and Zhou (2005) 
                                                 
5 The results are different from Wan (2004), who did not use the regional price deflators of Brandt and 
Carsten (2004). A different modelling strategy was also followed in Wan (2004), where location was not 
fully accounted for. 
6 The decomposition results for 1985 and 1986 seem to produce unusually large contributions of the 
residual term. But our results look more acceptable than those of Morduch and Sicular (2002) and they 
are consistent over years in terms of trends of the individual contributions.   21
who used household data instead of aggregate regional data. On the other hand, 
education was the second largest contributor and its position more or less matched that 
of industrialization since 1996. The contribution of industrialization is large but smaller 
than that suggested by earlier studies of Rozelle (1994) and Wan (2001). Such an 
inconsistency is most likely due to contamination in early analytical frameworks, where 
other factors were not controlled for. Wan (2004) obtained a smaller contribution than 
Rozelle (1994) and Wan (2001) after controlling for some variables. However, Wan 
(2004) did not incorporate regional dummy variables in his income function. When 
location dummies are included, as in this study, the contribution of industrialization is 
bound to become even smaller. 
 
The only negative contributor is household size. As it represents labour input and labour 
is more abundant in poor regions, such a finding is justified. In reality, the household 
size may imply extra income from side line activities (Wan 2004). Unfortunately, this 
only equalizing factor only makes negligible impacts on the total inequality. 
Furthermore, as household size converges in China, this mild equalizing contribution will 
disappear in the long run. Related to the household size variable, dependency ratio makes 
a negligible but positive contribution. Land is found to be an inequality-increasing 
contributor. This is caused by the negative returns to land in China for many of the years 
under study. It is known that poor regions possess more land and poor households are 
those who mainly engage in farming. If government support is effective enough to reverse 
the sign of the land marginal product, land would be an equalizing factor in rural China. 
5  Summary and policy implications 
In this paper, we constructed a time profile of rural regional inequality in China over the 
period 1985-2002. We further decomposed total regional inequality into between (east-
central-west) belts contribution and contributions due to regional income gaps within 
these belts. Both the conventional decomposition and the proposed Shapley value 
decomposition yielded similar results. Finally, we applied the inequality accounting 
framework of Wan (2004) to identify root sources of the total inequality. Several 
findings deserve special mention. 
 
First, regional income is found to diverge, more between regional belts than within 
these belts. In other words, inequality between regional belts as well as that within these 
belts has been on the rise. The fast increase in regional inequality is accompanied by 
worsening polarization. Second, while the east-central-west divide constituted some 50 
per cent of the total regional inequality in the mid 1980s, its contribution increased to 
around 60 per cent as from 1996. Third, location and location-related factors comprise 
the largest contributor to total regional inequality although its percentage contribution 
has decreased over time. Fourth, capital and rural industrialization are the second and 
third largest contributors to total inequality. Finally, schooling or human capital has   22
been gaining importance as a determinant of regional inequality. Based on these 
findings, we can derive the following policy implications:  
(a)  National policy must target regional belts, not only individual regions. As 
farming structure becomes more homogenous in neighbouring regions, policy-
induced and other shocks are likely to enhance polarization unless 
supplementary measures are taken at the stage of policy design.  
(b)  While infrastructure investment in inland regions are necessary, more attention 
should be given to capital accumulation at the household level in the poor 
regions. It is possible that capital accumulation may become the largest 
contributor to regional inequality in the not too distant future. Thus, 
development of rural capital market, particularly credit access to the poor, 
should be placed on the top agenda of central and local governments. 
(c)  More concerted efforts must be devoted to human capital accumulation in poor 
areas. Schooling might not matter so much in largely subsistence China in the 
1970s or early 1980s, such is not the case any more. The growing contribution 
of schooling to regional inequality appeals for serious government educational 
input in the interior regions.  
(d)  Continued support for generating non-farming incomes in the poor regions can 
lead to substantial reduction in regional inequality. Fiscal and budgetary policies 
should make allowance for the initiation and growth of rural industries in the 
inland regions as far as inequality reduction is concerned.  
(e)  Finally, much more is needed than the abolition of agriculture tax in providing 
assistance to grain farmers. This is not only has bearing on the food security of 
the nation, but also is potentially effective for combating the high level of 
regional inequality in China.   23
Appendix 
Table A1: Composition of regional inequality in rural China 
  Within belt of  Total 
Year  Between belts  east central  west Theil-L 
1985 0.010  0.002  0.004  0.004  0.020 
1986 0.012  0.003  0.006  0.005  0.025 
1987 0.015  0.003  0.005  0.004  0.027 
1988 0.015  0.004  0.005  0.005  0.029 
1989 0.018  0.003  0.004  0.004  0.030 
1990 0.018  0.004  0.006  0.004  0.032 
1991 0.019  0.004  0.005  0.004  0.032 
1992 0.023  0.005  0.005  0.004  0.036 
1993 0.029  0.006  0.004  0.004  0.043 
1994 0.030  0.005  0.007  0.004  0.046 
1995 0.040  0.005  0.007  0.004  0.056 
1996 0.039  0.007  0.007  0.005  0.058 
1997 0.038  0.008  0.006  0.005  0.057 
1998 0.036  0.008  0.006  0.006  0.056 
1999 0.037  0.008  0.006  0.006  0.058 
2000 0.037  0.008  0.006  0.006  0.057 
2001 0.041  0.008  0.006  0.006  0.061 
2002 0.041  0.008  0.006  0.007  0.062 
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Table A2: Shapley decomposition of regional inequality into between- and within- components 
  Between  Within belt of      Between Within belt of   
Year belts  east central  West Total    belts  east  central  west  Total 
 Gini    Theil-L 
1985 0.050  0.019 0.024 0.016 0.109    0.010  0.002 0.004 0.003  0.020 
1986 0.054  0.023 0.029 0.018 0.123    0.013  0.003 0.005 0.004  0.025 
1987 0.063  0.025 0.025 0.017 0.129    0.015  0.004 0.005 0.003  0.027 
1988 0.060  0.029 0.025 0.019 0.134    0.015  0.005 0.005 0.004  0.029 
1989 0.070  0.027 0.022 0.018 0.137    0.018  0.004 0.004 0.004  0.030 
1990 0.069  0.028 0.027 0.017 0.141    0.018  0.005 0.005 0.003  0.032 
1991 0.074  0.028 0.024 0.017 0.142    0.020  0.005 0.004 0.003  0.032 
1992 0.079  0.032 0.025 0.015 0.151    0.022  0.006 0.004 0.003  0.036 
1993 0.094  0.035 0.022 0.013 0.164    0.029  0.008 0.004 0.003  0.043 
1994 0.092  0.034 0.030 0.014 0.170    0.030  0.007 0.007 0.003  0.046 
1995 0.110  0.034 0.030 0.012 0.186    0.039  0.007 0.006 0.003  0.056 
1996 0.104  0.039 0.032 0.013 0.188    0.038  0.009 0.007 0.003  0.058 
1997 0.104  0.041 0.027 0.014 0.186    0.037  0.011 0.006 0.004  0.057 
1998 0.100  0.042 0.028 0.016 0.186    0.035  0.011 0.006 0.004  0.056 
1999 0.102  0.043 0.028 0.016 0.188    0.036  0.011 0.006 0.005  0.058 
2000 0.103  0.042 0.027 0.016 0.188    0.036  0.011 0.006 0.004  0.057 
2001 0.108  0.042 0.028 0.016 0.195    0.039  0.011 0.006 0.005  0.061 
2002 0.110  0.042 0.027 0.016 0.195    0.040  0.011 0.006 0.005  0.062 
 Theil-T    CV
2 
1985 0.010  0.002 0.004 0.003 0.019    0.019  0.005 0.008 0.005  0.037 
1986 0.012  0.003 0.005 0.003 0.024    0.024  0.008 0.010 0.006  0.047 
1987 0.015  0.004 0.004 0.003 0.026    0.030  0.009 0.009 0.005  0.052 
1988 0.015  0.005 0.005 0.004 0.028    0.030  0.012 0.009 0.006  0.057 
1989 0.018  0.005 0.004 0.003 0.029    0.036  0.010 0.007 0.005  0.059   25
1990 0.018  0.005 0.005 0.003 0.031    0.036  0.012 0.009 0.005  0.062 
1991 0.019  0.006 0.004 0.003 0.032    0.040  0.013 0.007 0.005  0.065 
1992 0.022  0.007 0.004 0.003 0.036    0.045  0.015 0.008 0.004  0.072 
1993 0.028  0.008 0.003 0.002 0.042    0.057  0.019 0.007 0.004  0.086 
1994 0.029  0.008 0.006 0.003 0.045    0.057  0.017 0.012 0.004  0.090 
1995 0.037  0.008 0.006 0.002 0.054    0.074  0.018 0.012 0.003  0.107 
1996 0.036  0.010 0.007 0.003 0.055    0.069  0.021 0.014 0.004  0.109 
1997 0.035  0.011 0.006 0.003 0.054    0.069  0.023 0.011 0.004  0.106 
1998 0.033  0.011 0.006 0.003 0.053    0.065  0.023 0.011 0.005  0.105 
1999 0.035  0.011 0.006 0.003 0.055    0.068  0.024 0.011 0.006  0.109 
2000 0.035  0.011 0.006 0.003 0.055    0.069  0.024 0.011 0.005  0.110 
2001 0.038  0.012 0.006 0.003 0.059    0.075  0.026 0.012 0.005  0.118 
2002 0.039  0.011 0.006 0.003 0.059    0.077  0.025 0.011 0.005  0.119 
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